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CLIENT INTERESTS AND A LAWYER'S
DUTY TO EXPEDITE LITIGATION: DOES
MODEL RULE 3.2 IMPOSE ANY
INDEPENDENT OBLIGATIONS?
ERNEST F. LIDGE III
INTRODUCTION
Rule 3.2 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") requires lawyers to "make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client,"1 while other rules impose complementary
obligations.2 How far does this duty to expedite litigation
extend? Is the client's interest an absolute defense to the charge
of failing to expedite litigation, or are there some client interests
that do not justify a lawyer's use of delaying tactics?
Consider the lawyers' conduct in the following hypotheticals.
Have the attorneys behaved unethically?
Hypothetical 1-In a civil action, a court decides for the plaintiff
and instructs the plaintiffs lawyer to draft a form of judgment
and give it to the defendant's lawyer for approval. The
defendant and the defendant's lawyer, however, prefer not to
approve the proposed judgment because there is another case
pending before a different court, and the ruling on appeal in the
latter case could provide a justification for a reconsideration or
reversal of the first judgment against the defendant. Once the
judgment is entered in the defendant's case, the clock will begin
t Professor of Law, University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law;
J.D., 1984, University of Illinois; M.A., 1981, University of Illinois; B.S., Education,
1976, Northern Illinois University. I would like to thank my research assistant Lee
Popkin. I would also like to thank the University of Memphis School of Law for
providing a grant that supported the research for this Article.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2008).
2 See, e.g., id. R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client"); id. R. 1.4 (requiring promptness in
communicating with a client); id. R. 4.4(a) (barring a lawyer from using "means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person").
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to run on an appeal or a motion for a new trial. Delaying the
entry of judgment, therefore, could have a beneficial effect on
the defendant's case. If the defendant's attorney fails to
approve the proposed judgment, the plaintiff will have other
means under the state's rules of civil procedure to pursue his
judgment. In order to delay the entry of judgment, the
defendant's lawyer refuses to approve the proposed judgment.3
Hypothetical 2-The plaintiff files a complaint in a civil action.
The jurisdiction's rules of civil procedure allow the defendant
thirty days to file an answer. The defendant's attorney,
however, has the answer prepared within five days.
Nevertheless, the defendant's attorney waits until the thirtieth
day to file the answer. He does not have a good reason for
waiting.4
Hypothetical 3-A law firm represents an insurance company, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a national drug company.
Insurance defense work for the insurance company forms a
substantial portion of the billable hours of two of the law firm's
partners. The insurance company informs the law firm that the
drug company is drawing heavily on the insurance company's
financial reserves to defeat an attempt at a leveraged buyout of
the drug company. The insurance company requests that the
law firm "seek[s] delays in all pending cases to avoid the
possibility of adverse publicity and adverse cash flow that would
result from unfavorable jury rewards."5 This course of action
would presumably assist the drug company's fight against the
buyout. The law firm accedes to the client's request.6
Hypothetical 4-A federal agency decided to impose a ban on
certain chemical preservatives in wine that cause cancer. The
lawyer's client, a vineyard owner, has already produced half of
the current season's wines with one of those preservatives. The
client is afraid that he will have to shut down the vineyard if he
cannot sell the wine prior to the promulgation of the regulation.
The owner laments the loss of his employees' livelihood and
mentions the hope that, in the future, the federal agency will
3 See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 90-16 (1990),
available at 1990 WL 10521405.
' See id.
5 Id. (emphasis added).
6 See James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L.
REV. 735, 774 n.79 (1992).
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discover scientific evidence that will cause it to reverse the ban
on the preservatives. He also mentions that it is "foolish to
worry about carcinogenic additives to the food and liquids we
consume" when there are "so many 'natural' cancer-causing
agents."7 The owner asks his lawyer to use the legal system to
obtain enough of a delay to allow the vineyard to sell the wine
before the ban goes into effect. The lawyer complies.
8
Hypothetical 5-Lawyer A is negotiating a settlement
agreement with Lawyer B, who is desperately trying to finish
the deal because he has bought non-refundable super-saver
tickets for a European vacation with his family. Lawyer A's
client wants Lawyer A to use delaying tactics to take advantage
of Lawyer B's vulnerability to squeeze him for every possible
advantage. Lawyer A does so.
9
Hypothetical 6-Plaintiff sues defendant for $10 million. The
defendant acknowledges to his lawyer that he clearly owes the
plaintiff the money, and the lawyer knows that the plaintiff will
be able to prove the case at trial. The client, however, asks the
lawyer to delay because he (the defendant) is earning an
incredible return on the money, much more than the interest
the defendant will have to pay on any judgment. The lawyer
complies with the client's request.1
Hypothetical 7-In a criminal case, the defense lawyer makes a
decision, with the consent of his client, to refrain from raising a
speedy trial defense to delay trial "as long as possible so that
the prosecution might make a serious error, witnesses'
memories might deteriorate, or witnesses may become
unavailable."
11
Hypothetical 8-A criminal defendant's mental health problems
make him incompetent to stand trial, although taking
medication would restore the defendant's competence. The
defendant's lawyer believes that delaying the trial might benefit
the defendant (because witnesses may become unavailable or
Id. at 777-78.
See id. at 777 (citing THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 136-40 (2d ed. 1981)).
' See id. at 783.
10 See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 28.4 (3d ed.
Supp. 2007).
11 See People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 695 (Colo. 1984); see also CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.2.5 n.44 (1986).
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the government may abandon the prosecution). The lawyer
advises the defendant of the benefits of refusing medication in
order to delay the return of the defendant's competence to stand
trial. 12
Hypothetical 9-The lawyer's client, a criminal defendant,
acknowledges his guilt. The state is almost certain that it will
be able to prove his guilt at trial and [that] the defendant will
be sentenced to a lengthy jail term. The defendant is free on
bond and asks his lawyer to keep him out of jail for as long as
possible. The lawyer engages in delaying tactics to keep his
client out of jail.
Hypothetical 10-Same facts as in Hypothetical 9, but in this
case, the client, a convicted murderer, is on death row. The
client has asked his lawyer to delay his execution as long as
possible. The lawyer does so. 13
These hypotheticals illustrate the problems with defining the
duty to expedite litigation. Do delaying tactics that are not
inherently unethical violate this obligation? Does delay have to
be justified by a "legitimate" client interest? Are there client
interests that are not legitimate? How much teeth does Model
Rule 3.2 actually have? Does Model Rule 3.2 impose any
independent obligation at all?
Part I of this Article discusses the ethical rules that are
relevant to delay, particularly Model Rule 3.2 and its
accompanying comment. The text of Rule 3.2 is clear,
subordinating the lawyer's duty to expedite litigation to the
interests of the client. The text does not distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate client interests. The comment to the
Rule, on the other hand, is very ambiguous and provides little
guidance. A close analysis of the Rule and the comment's
language, however, demonstrates that, so long as a client's
interest is lawful and not for the purpose of harassing another
party, there is no basis for distinguishing between types of client
interests in judging the propriety of a lawyer's delaying actions.
12 See David M. Siegel, Psychoactive Medication and Your Client: Better Living
and (Maybe) Better Law Through Chemistry, CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 22, 28, 30.
13 See Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous
Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1167, 1178 (2003) (discussing
Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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The key distinction is whether the tactics themselves are proper
or improper.
Part II distinguishes between tactics that are inherently
unethical and tactics that are not inherently unethical. There
are some tactics that may cause delay that are unethical in and
of themselves, such as filing a frivolous motion in a civil case, 4
making a false statement of law or fact to a tribunal,'15 lying to
another person about a material fact, 6 or unlawfully destroying
evidence or obstructing another party's access to evidence. 7 A
lawyer's use of such tactics will always be unethical, regardless of
the lawyer's reasons or the client's interests. On the other hand,
there are delaying tactics, such as filing several non-frivolous
motions, requesting a jury trial, or waiting until the last possible
moment to file pleadings, which are not inherently unethical.
Part II also discusses whether certain types of client motivations
for delay can render a lawyer's use of an otherwise ethical tactic
an unethical failure to expedite litigation. Part II concludes that
the lawyer's use of ethical tactics will not be rendered unethical
simply because the lawyer's motivation is to serve his client's
lawful interest in delay. Part II also concludes that Model Rule
3.2 adds no duties to those mandated by other provisions in the
Rules.
Part II ends with a discussion of the special problems
inherent in criminal law practice. Model Rule 3.1, which bars
lawyers from "defend[ing] a proceeding, or assert[ing] or
controvert[ing] an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous," contains an exception
for criminal defense lawyers, allowing them to "nevertheless so
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.""8 Thus, criminal defense lawyers may have
greater leeway to seek delay in their client's interest.
Part III discusses cases in which courts have sanctioned
attorneys for delays in litigation, either under court rules or Rule
3.2. Invariably, the attorney's delaying conduct is interwoven
with improper tactics, such as making misstatements and
misrepresentations to the court, disobeying court orders, or
14 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008).
15 See id. R. 3.3.
16 See id. R. 4.1(a).
17 See id. R. 3.4(a).
18 Id. R. 3.1.
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bringing frivolous contentions before the court. Part III
concludes that if a lawyer is serving a lawful client interest by
engaging in delaying tactics, courts will not sanction the lawyer
unless the tactics themselves are improper.
Thus, a lawyer does not violate Rule 3.2 unless the lawyer
engages in other improper conduct, thereby violating another one
of the Rules. Part IV compares this to the law of duress. Under
the law of duress or coercion, an action forcing another to do
something against his will is not unlawful unless the action is
independently wrongful. Although it may be immoral, "[i]t is not
duress to threaten to do that which a party has a legal right to
do." 9 Similarly, the use of a delaying tactic is not unethical
unless the delay is for an unlawful purpose or the tactic itself is
inherently unethical. In other words, Rule 3.2 imposes no
independent obligations. A violation of Rule 3.2 will always
involve a violation of another Rule.
Thus, a lawyer who uses a delaying tactic that is not
inherently improper to accomplish a lawful client purpose should
not be subject to discipline. What if, however, the lawyer
disagrees with the client's proposed course of conduct (perhaps
for moral reasons)? If the client wants the attorney to use
delaying tactics but the lawyer does not wish to use those tactics,
must the lawyer do so? Part V discusses the division between the
lawyer's and the client's authority and concludes that usually a
lawyer does not have to engage in delaying tactics at the client's
behest. In addition, the client's insistence on delaying tactics
may, in some circumstances, provide grounds for the lawyer to
withdraw from the representation.
Part VI applies the principles discussed to the hypotheticals
raised in this Introduction. Assuming that the lawyers do not
use improper tactics and that the client's interests are lawful, the
lawyer's conduct in each of the hypotheticals is not disciplinable.
Given that Model Rule 3.2 imposes no independent ethical
duty, the Conclusion discusses whether Rule 3.2 should be
repealed. The situation is analogous to the old Model Code
provision, DR 7-105(A),2 ° which banned a lawyer from
threatening criminal prosecution to obtain an advantage in a
court case. The provision was dropped when the American Bar
11 Ellis v. First Nat'l Bank, 260 S.W. 714, 715 (Ark. 1924).
20 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1980).
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Association ("ABA") promulgated the Model Rules. The ABA
deliberately omitted the Model Code's ban on threatening
criminal prosecution because the ban was redundant and
overbroad.21 It was redundant because the harmful conduct the
ban prohibited was covered by other Rules. It was overbroad
because the ban could, in some circumstances, prevent a lawyer
from engaging in legitimate advocacy for his client.
It could be argued that the ABA should drop Model Rule 3.2
for similar reasons. The Rule adds no independent obligations-
using unethical tactics or serving unlawful client purposes are
both covered by other Rules. In addition, the ambiguous
comment could be read to ban legitimate advocacy. On the other
hand, the text of the Rule itself is unambiguous, clearly
subordinating the duty to expedite litigation to the interests of
the client, and the Rule's language may have a beneficial
hortatory effect. Accordingly, it is not necessary to repeal the
Rule itself-any potential harm comes from the ambiguous and
unhelpful comment. The ABA should delete the comment to Rule
3.2 and replace it with general language stating that a lawyer
should act promptly at all times, so long as these actions are
consistent with the interests of the client.
The Conclusion summarizes this Article's contentions. In
interpreting Rule 3.2, courts and disciplinary authorities should
adhere to the Rule's text. The text of the Rule subordinates the
duty to expedite litigation to the client's interests. Authorities
should only discipline attorneys for violations of Rule 3.2 in three
circumstances: (1) when the delaying tactics themselves are
unethical; (2) when the client's interest in delay is to serve an
unlawful purpose; 22 or (3)when the client has no substantial
purpose other than spite-embarrassing, delaying, or burdening
another person.23
I. MODEL RULE 3.2 AND OTHER MODEL RULES
Several Model Rules directly deal with the issue of delay-
Rules 1.3, 3.2, 3.4(e), and 4.4(a). Model Rule 1.3 requires that a
lawyer "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
21 See J. Nick Badgerow, Rattling the Saber: The Ethics of Threatening Criminal
and Disciplinary Prosecution, 61 J. Mo. B. 13, 13 (2005).
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4. 1(b) (2008).
23 See id. R. 4.4(a).
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representing a client."24 That Rule deals with a lawyer's duty to
his client, while Rules 3.2, 3.4(e), and 4.4(a) relate to a lawyer's
duty to others.25  Model Rule 4.4(a) bans a lawyer, when
representing a client, from "us[ing] means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person.26 Model Rule 3.4(d) bans a lawyer from "mak[ing]
a frivolous discovery request or fail[ing] to make reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request
by an opposing party."27 Model Rule 3.2, requiring that a lawyer
expedite litigation, is also concerned with an opposing party's
interests in avoiding delay.2"
What if, however, an opposing party's interest in expediting
litigation conflicts with the interests of a client in delaying
matters? The text of Model Rule 3.2 subordinates the interests of
other people to the interests of the client. Model Rule 3.2 states:
"A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client."29 Thus, while a lawyer
has to "make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation," this duty
is qualified by "the interests of the client."3° The Rule leads to
two questions. First, what are "reasonable" efforts? Second, do
any and all of the "interests" of the client excuse the duty to
expedite litigation?
The only comment to the Rule equivocates. The comment
states:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may
properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not
proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely
24 Id. R. 1.3.
25 See 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 6.2 n.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2003) ("[T]he
'promptness' requirement of Rule 1.3 has reference to handling a client's affairs with
dispatch, and not procrastinating. When a lawyer unjustifiably delays a matter that
is in litigation, to the detriment of an opposing party, the governing Rule is Model
Rule 3.2, Expediting Litigation.").
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (emphasis added).
27 Id. R. 3.4(d) (emphasis added); see also id. R. 3.4(c). Rule 3.4(c) bans a lawyer
from "knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal." Id. R.
3.4(c). Such obligations would include briefing schedules and Rule l1's ban on filing
court papers for the purpose of delay. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 annot.; id. R. 3.4 annot.; see also 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra
note 10, § 6.2 n.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
'8 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id.
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for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to
expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an
opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It
is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by
the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having
some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial
or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is
not a legitimate interest of the client. 1
This explanatory comment is not helpful. In regard to what
constitutes a failure to make "reasonable efforts," the comment
states that "[a]lthough there will be occasions when a lawyer may
properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not
proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely
for the convenience of the advocates."32 Presumably, a lawyer
could seek an extension of a deadline if his child is sick or if he
wants to take a vacation. The comment merely bans a lawyer
from "routinely" engaging in such delaying practices "solely" for
the lawyer's convenience. 3 Accordingly, a lawyer may seek delay
for his own convenience on a non-routine basis, and delaying
matters for the client's interest would not fall under this
sentence.
Suppose a lawyer does violate this sentence of the comment
to Model Rule 3.2 by "routinely" failing to expedite litigation
"solely" for the lawyer's convenience? While the lawyer would be
violating Model Rule 3.2, that Rule would be adding nothing to
other obligations in the Model Rules. If the lawyer is not
pursuing the client's interests but solely the lawyer's own
convenience, the lawyer would be violating Model Rule 1.3, which
requires lawyers to "act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client."34 As comment 3 to Rule 1.3
notes, procrastination can adversely affect a client's interests and
"can cause a client needless anxiety. ' 3' Furthermore, if a lawyer
is charging an hourly fee, delaying actions that are not in the
client's interest would violate the ban in Model Rule 1.5 on
31 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. R. 1.3.
31 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 3.
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charging an unreasonable fee.36 In addition, a lawyer who
routinely ignores briefing schedules or other court-imposed
deadlines, solely for the lawyer's convenience, would be violating
the ban in Model Rule 3.4(c) on "knowingly disobey[ing] an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal. 37  Thus, the ban
contained in the comment to Rule 3.2 on "routinely fail[ing] to
expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates"
does not add anything to duties contained in other Rules.38
The comment to Model Rule 3.2 also states that the delaying
action is not "reasonable" if the lawyer is motivated by "the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain
rightful redress or repose. " 9 Thus, delay solely for the sake of
delay itself is unethical, but delay that has another purpose is
not necessarily unethical. The language is similar to Model Rule
4.4(a), which states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person .... 4o Similarly,
another sentence in the comment to Rule 3.2 states that the test
is "whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard
the course of action as having some substantial purpose other
than delay."41  Thus, actions that cause delay-assuming they
are not otherwise unethical-do not fall within the comment's
ban unless the actions have no "substantial purpose other than
delay."42  Presumably, the language of Rule 4.4(a) and the
comment to Rule 3.2 mean that a lawyer may not obey a client
who spitefully says, "I hate the opposing party, and I simply do
not want him to obtain his 'rightful redress.' I, therefore,
instruct you to delay."
In addition to Model Rule 4.4(a), court rules such as Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bar this type of conduct.43
36 See id. R. 1.5(a); id. R. 1.5 cmt. 5 ("A lawyer should not exploit a fee
arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.").
31 Id. R. 3.4(c); see also 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 30.7 ("The basic
proposition of Rule 3.4(c) is ... simply that court orders and court rules must be
obeyed until such time as they are successfully challenged.").
38 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
" Id. (emphasis added).
40 Id. R. 4.4(a).
41 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
42 Id.
43 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b) (requiring attorneys to sign pleadings, written
motions, and other papers with such signature being a certification that the paper,
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Therefore, the sentence in Rule 3.2's comment stating that the
failure to expedite litigation is not reasonable "if done for the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain
rightful redress or repose"4 adds no independent duty to the
ethical rules.
What about client purposes other than delay for the sake of
delay, such as the client's acquisition of money, gaining a tactical
advantage in litigation, or postponing incarceration or the death
penalty? This brings us to another question: Does the language
of Model Rule 3.2 mean that there are some client purposes that
do not justify delay and others that do?
The text of the Rule itself does not support such a
distinction. The language simply states that the duty to expedite
litigation applies when "consistent with the interests of the
client."45 The comment to Model Rule 3.2 offers little guidance,
merely stating: "Realizing financial or other benefit from
otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest
of the client."46 Does this mean that disciplinary authorities,
when faced with a lawyer's delay in the client's interest or at the
client's behest, must decide whether the client's interest is
legitimate or illegitimate? The text of Model Rule 3.2's Proposed
Final Draft stated that, "A LAWYER SHALL MAKE
REASONABLE EFFORT CONSISTENT WITH THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE CLIENT TO EXPEDITE
LITIGATION."47 In the final version, the word "legitimate" was
dropped from the text of the Rule and, according to one treatise,
was "incorporated into the last sentence of Comment [1]. "48
Dropping the word "legitimate" from the text, however, has
changed its meaning. Under the language of the original
Proposed Draft, the word "legitimate" modified the word
"interests," presumably a significant narrowing of the types of
interests that would justify delay. The current draft, in addition
to significantly weakening the force of the language by dropping
to the attorney's best "knowledge, information, and belief... is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to.. . cause unnecessary delay").
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
45 Id. R. 3.2.
46 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
47 Id. R. 3.2 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (capitalization in original); see also 2
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.3.
48 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.3.
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the word "legitimate" into the comment,4 9 has changed the
language itself. The current comment states that "[rlealizing
financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in
litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client."" Presumably,
if the delay is not "otherwise improper," realizing financial or
other benefit is a legitimate interest of the client.
Thus, an attorney may use delaying tactics in the client's
lawful interests unless the tactics, in and of themselves, are
improper. The key to interpreting Rule 3.2 is distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate tactics.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INHERENTLY UNETHICAL TACTICS
AND PROPER, ALBEIT UNNECESSARY, TACTICS
A. Civil Cases
Tactics or strategies that lawyers may use to delay litigation
can be divided into two categories. First, there are tactics that
are unethical in and of themselves, such as filing frivolous
papers, making frivolous assertions, lying to the court, or lying
about a material matter to another party.51 The second category
covers tactics that are not inherently unethical, although using
such tactics might have the effect of causing delay. An example
of this would be filing numerous non-frivolous motions. It is
important to understand the distinction between tactics that are
inherently improper and others that are not. Consider the
following tactics that a lawyer may use to accomplish delay.
Category I
(1) Filing several frivolous motions.
(2) Filing frivolous discovery requests or failing to comply
with proper discovery requests.
49 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 14, 21 (while the comments
are "guides to interpretation," they "do not add obligations to the Rules," and "the
text of each Rule is authoritative").
Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
51 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (proscribing frivolous filings); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (proscribing frivolous filings and assertions); id. R. 3.3(a)(1)
(prohibiting a lawyer from making "false statement[s] of fact or law to a tribunal");
id. R. 4.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making "false statement[s] of material fact or
law to a third person").
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(1) Filing several non-frivolous, but unnecessary, motions.
(2) Waiting the full time period allowed to file pleadings
throughout the litigation in spite of the fact that the
pleadings are often ready for filing significantly before the
deadlines.
(3) When a judge is establishing a briefing schedule or a
trial date and when the judge asks for suggestions from the
lawyers, asking for more time than is strictly necessary.
(4) Asking for a jury trial when the jurisdiction has a
backlog on such trials. Assume that the jury trial request is
made not because a jury trial is preferable, but because it
will take longer.
In the context of civil litigation,53 Category I's first tactic, the
filing of frivolous motions, is always unethical, regardless of the
reason. Even if the client has an excellent reason for delay, a
lawyer may not file a frivolous motion. Model Rule 3.1 states: "A
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."5 4 Similar obligations are imposed by Rule 11 of the Federal
52 There are also tactics that are improper (and thus fall within Category I), but
are usually not sanctioned unless they are repeated or are particularly egregious.
Examples of this would be lack of preparation for a trial or abnormally lengthy
responses to a judge's questions during trial. Bawle v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 79 Fed.
App'x. 875 (6th Cir. 2003), an opinion not recommended for full text publication,
provides an example of a court sanctioning an attorney for such conduct. In Bawle,
the district court had ordered the plaintiffs' and defendant's counsel to file a
proposed joint pretrial order. Id. at 876-77. The parties filed the order tardily in
part because of the plaintiff counsel's delaying tactics such as "habitually" cancelling
scheduled meetings with the defense counsel, "often at the last minute." Id. at 878.
The plaintiffs' counsel also delayed the copying of exhibits. Id. In addition, the
district court found that it was an 'unnecessarily long trial" because the plaintiffs'
counsel engaged in the following conduct: (1) "consistently" engaging in "overly-long
and often irrelevant presentation of direct examination," (2) providing unreasonably
long responses to the court's questions, and (3) demonstrating a lack of preparation
for trial. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court had acted within its
discretion in imposing a $41,192 sanction against the plaintiffs' counsel. Id. at 878-
79.
5 For a discussion of frivolous motions in the criminal context, see infra Part
II.B.
54 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
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Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that all pleadings and
other court papers be signed by a lawyer with such signature
constituting a certification that the assertions in the paper "are
warranted by existing law" and "have evidentiary support."5
5
Model Rule 3.4(c), in turn, bars a lawyer from "knowingly
disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal."56 Filing
a frivolous motion in a civil case is always disciplinable,
regardless of the purpose of the motion.
Similarly, the other Category I tactics will be disciplinable
regardless of the lawyer's desire to serve a client's interest and
regardless of the nature of that interest. Rule 3.4(d) bans a party
from "mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or fail[ing] to make
[a] reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request. '57 Rule 3.3(a) bars a lawyer from making false
statements to a tribunal,5" and Rule 4.1 bars lawyers, while
representing a client, from making false statements of material
fact to third persons.59
What about the first tactic in Category II-filing several non-
frivolous motions? Model Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to "act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."6°
The comment, requiring that the lawyer represent the client with
"commitment," "dedication," and "zeal," adds that "[a] lawyer is
not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be
realized for a client."61 The comment's words "not bound" to push
for a client's "every advantage" and the subsequent sentence
stating that the lawyer has "professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued,"62
imply that a lawyer may "press for every advantage," so long as
the lawyer is not violating another Rule, such as the ban on filing
frivolous motions. Of course, a separate question is whether the
lawyer should press for every advantage in a given context,63 but
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); see also FED. R. APP. P. 38 (giving courts of
appeals discretion to "award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee"
for the appellant's frivolous appeal).
56 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c).
5' Id. R. 3.4(d).
68 Id. R. 3.3(a).
- Id. R. 4.1(a).
60 Id. R. 1.3.
61 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
62 Id.
6' See infra Part V.
[Vol. 83:307
2009] A LAWYER'S DUTY TO EXPEDITE LITIGATION 321
the question at hand is whether the filing of several non-frivolous
motions is itself disciplinable. The answer is no. In and of itself,
such a tactic is not a violation of the Rules.
The second tactic in Category II involves a lawyer waiting
the full time period allowed to file pleadings or other papers
throughout the litigation despite the fact that the papers are
often ready for filing significantly before the deadlines.
Presumably, it could be argued that the lawyer's duty to
"expedite litigation" requires that the lawyer file the papers as
soon as they are ready, but this would be an odd result. The
rules of civil procedure, court rules, or a court order grant the
party and its lawyer a certain time period to file a paper. The
lawyer should be able to take advantage of that time period,
regardless of the reason. This is illustrated by an ethical opinion
from Arizona-Arizona Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee Opinion No. 90-16.64
In that opinion, the court, in a civil action, decided for the
plaintiff and ordered the plaintiffs lawyer to draft a form of
judgment and give it to the defendant's lawyer for approval as to
form. The plaintiffs lawyer had completed the proposed form of
judgment, and the inquiring lawyer, who represented the
defendant in the case, acknowledged that the proposed form of
judgment complied "fully with the court's decision. "65 The
defendant's lawyer, however, knew of another pending case that
could result in a ruling that would "justify reconsideration or
reversal of the court's decision in this case."66 Once the court
entered judgment in the defendant's case, however, the time
clock would begin to run on a motion for a new trial and for an
appeal. The defendant wanted "to avoid having to pay fees to
move for a new trial or to appeal until after there [was] a ruling
on the appeal in the other case, and he ... instructed the
inquiring attorney to delay entry of judgment."67 The defendant's
attorney asked if he could "ethically decline to approve the
proposed judgment as to form" in order to prevent judgment from
being entered immediately.6 The defendant's lawyer also asked
' Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 90-16 (1990),
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if he could "ethically object to the form of the proposed
judgment. 69
After quoting Rule 3.2 in its entirety, the Advisory
Committee stated that the answer to the first question-whether
the defendant could ethically decline to approve the proposed
judgment in order to prevent judgment from being entered at
once-was "yes. '7° The Advisory Committee gave two reasons for
its decision. First, since Rule 3.2 subjected the duty to expedite
litigation to "the interests of the client," the client's interests
appeared to justify the attorney declining to approve the
proposed judgment as to form to prevent the judgment from
being entered at once. 71  Besides, the state's rules of civil
procedure provided another means for the plaintiff to pursue the
judgment. The second reason given by the Advisory Committee
was that it believed that an attorney does not act unethically "if
he takes advantage of the time limits provided for in the Rules."72
The Committee stated:
A defendant may withhold answering a complaint for 20 days,
and a party may withhold responding to discovery for the period
of time prescribed in the Rules. In our view, such "withholding"
does not become prescribed "delay" even if the party were ready
to answer the complaint or reply to the discovery prior to
expiration of the prescribed time limits. Likewise, we do not
believe that an attorney is obligated to take affirmative steps to
shorten the time within which relief may be awarded against
his client.73
In regard to the inquiring attorney's second question-
whether the attorney could "ethically object to the form of the
proposed judgment"-the Advisory Committee answered "no."74
Since the inquiring attorney acknowledged that the judgment
was proper as to form, such assertion would violate Rule
69 Id.
70 Id.
7 The state version of Rule 3.2 tracked an earlier version of Model Rule 3.2. In
regard to that earlier version, in 2002, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the
proposal of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission to amend the comment to Rule 3.2.
The amendment did not change the text of Model Rule 3.2 and was "minor." See
STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 211 (Aspen Publishers 2004).
72 Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 90-16 (1990),
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3.3(a)(1). Rule 3.3(a)(1) bars a lawyer from knowingly making a
"false statement of fact or law to a tribunal."75 The Advisory
Committee also stated that such a false assertion would possibly
violate Rule 11.76
The ethical opinion makes perfect sense. While one could
argue that the duty in Model Rule 3.2 to expedite litigation
requires an attorney who finishes a pleading early to file the
pleading immediately, the ethical rules should not trump the
rules of civil procedure. The lawyer is entitled to take the full
amount of time allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The
lawyer's conduct becomes unethical only when the lawyer's
delaying tactic itself is improper, for example, lying to a tribunal.
What about the third Category II tactic? Suppose a judge
asks the lawyers involved in a case for a suggested briefing
schedule or a trial date. Assuming that delay will serve the
client's interest, may the lawyer ask for more time than is
actually needed? The lawyer, in responding, cannot deceive the
judge77 but a simple truthful response-"How about December
30th?"-would be fine. It is inconceivable that such a truthful
response, in and of itself, would violate Rule 3.2.
The final Category II tactic involves an attorney asking for a
jury trial because a backlog in the system will delay the onset of
trial. This situation is similar to an attorney taking the full
allotted time to file an answer. If the client has a statutory or
constitutional right to a jury trial, the attorney is entitled to take
advantage of that right, even if the jury trial request causes
unnecessary delay. The tactic is not inherently unethical.
In summary, using Category I tactics, such as filing frivolous
motions or asserting a frivolous position in a civil case, will
always be unethical. Using Category II tactics, such as filing
many non-frivolous motions, waiting the full allowed time
periods to file pleadings throughout the litigation, or demanding
a jury trial, will not, in and of itself, be unethical.
'5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2008).
76 Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 90-16 (1990),
available at 1990 WL 10521405. Presumably, such an assertion would also violate
Rule 3.1, barring the contravening of an issue in a proceeding unless there is a non-
frivolous basis in fact or law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1. The
Advisory Committee did not discuss that Rule.
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (barring a lawyer from making
"a false statement of law or fact to a tribunal").
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Should the reason for the client's desire to delay the case
render an (otherwise proper) tactic unethical? Of course, if the
client's purpose is criminal or fraudulent, the lawyer cannot in
any way assist the client in achieving this goal. 8 In addition, if a
lawyer's use of a tactic had no substantial purpose other than to
delay a third party, a lawyer's employment of this tactic would
violate Model Rule 4.4(a).79 Suppose, however, that the client's
goal is not illegal, fraudulent, or merely spiteful, but instead is
only of questionable public benefit. For example, suppose the
client wants to hang on to money a little longer, delay
incarceration, or increase bargaining pressure on the opposing
side. As discussed above,"° the text of Rule 3.2 does not
distinguish between kinds of client interests. The text simply
says that the lawyer has a duty to expedite litigation "consistent
with the interests of the client.""1 The comment to the Rule,
which cannot add obligations to the Rule, 2 is ambiguous. 3 Rule
3.2 provides no basis for, on the one hand, disciplining Lawyer A
for using delaying tactics in pursuit of Client 1's lawful (albeit,
selfish) objectives while, on the other hand, permitting Lawyer B
to use the same tactics in pursuit of Client 2's more "worthy" or
"legitimate" objectives.
Making such a distinction would present very thorny
questions. For example, which client interests are "legitimate"?
Assuming that the delaying tactics are not improper themselves,
is a client's desire to save money always inappropriate? What if
the client is an employer who hopes to hang onto money a bit
longer to save employee jobs or to pay for medical expenses for a
sick mother? What about the client's desire to delay
incarceration? Assuming delaying incarceration is a legitimate
purpose, does it become illegitimate if the client has confessed
guilt to his attorney? What about a client's desire to delay
execution?
Even if one could distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate client interests, courts and disciplinary authorities
are ill-equipped to make such determinations. How do they
78 See id. R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not.., assist a client[] in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .....
79 Id. R. 4.4(a).
80 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2.
82 See id. Scope T 14.
" See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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discover what the client's purpose for the delay was without
delving into confidential matters? 4  If a lawyer is faced with
sanctions for using otherwise legitimate tactics to accomplish an
illegitimate (but legal) client purpose, the Rules allow the lawyer
to reveal confidential information to defend his conduct.8 5 Should
courts, however, interpret Rule 3.2 in a way that places attorneys
in the position of having to reveal client confidences in order to
defend their conduct?
All of these problems, and the text of the Rule itself, compel
a simple conclusion: Assuming lawyers are serving a lawful
client purpose (other than pure spitefulness), 6 lawyers should
not be disciplined for using proper tactics to accomplish delay,
regardless of that purpose.
In other words, Model Rule 3.2 does not, and should not,
impose any independent duties. This principle can be
demonstrated by an example from one leading treatise. In an
illustration of a violation of Model Rule 3.2, the treatise gives the
following example:
Lawyer L has vigorously defended a products liability case in
state court, but a large judgment has been entered and affirmed
on appeal to the state's highest court. L tells his client that the
client must eventually pay the judgment, but he suggests filing
a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court so
that the finality of the judgment may be delayed a few more
months.
L is aware that the case presents no substantial federal
question, and that certiorari will certainly be denied. He
nevertheless states that filing the petition will be in the client's
best interest, for even though the client will incur additional
liability for interest on the judgment, the client will be able to
invest the money at higher market rates in the meantime.
L has clearly violated Rule 3.2. Deliberate delay of this kind is
prohibited even though the delay would be in the direct
financial interest of the client. This case is a graphic
illustration of the tension between an advocate's duty to the
- See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (banning a lawyer from
revealing information "relating to the representation").
' See id. R. 1.6(b)(5) (allowing a lawyer to reveal confidential information "to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client").
I Rule 4.4(a) states that a lawyer, when representing a client, cannot "use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person." Id. R 4.4(a).
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tribunal and his duty to his client. The tension is easily
resolved in this instance because the interest of the client is not
"legitimate" and is entitled to no weight.
Although the illustration demonstrates the "tension between
an advocate's duty to the tribunal and his duty to his client,"8 8 it
does not really demonstrate the independent efficacy of Model
Rule 3.2. Under the illustration, the lawyer is aware that the
case presents no substantial question and that certiorari will
certainly be denied. 9 Thus, the lawyer's conduct violates Model
Rule 3.1 because the lawyer is "bring[ing] ... a proceeding [the
appeal], or assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue therein," where
there is not "a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous."90 However, suppose that the first sentence of the
second paragraph of the illustration is changed to state the
following: "L is aware that the case arguably presents a federal
question, but that certiorari will probably be denied." Even if the
attorney's reason for filing the petition is that "the client will be
able to invest the money at higher market rates in the
meantime," would that conduct violate Model Rule 3.2? The
Article contends that it would not and that the violation of Rule
3.2 in the original illustration rests on the attorney's violation of
Model Rule 3.1. Although the treatise implies that the violation
in the original illustration rests on whether the client's interest is
"legitimate," I do not believe that is the case. The violation rests
on the fact that the proposed certiorari petition is frivolous
because it presents "no substantial federal question, and that
certiorari will certainly be denied."'" Model Rule 3.2 does not
impose independent duties in this illustration. In other words, a
violation of Rule 3.2 depends on whether the lawyer uses
improper tactics or not. A violation of the Rule does not depend
on the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate client
purposes.
B. The Special Case of Criminal Law
In regard to the distinction between proper and improper
tactics, Model Rule 3.1's ban on a lawyer's assertion of frivolous
87 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.4.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
"' 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.4 (emphasis added).
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issues or claims contains an exception for criminal proceedings.92
The Rule states: "A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to
require that every element of the case be established."93 In
criminal cases, the U.S. Constitution requires the government to
prove all elements of the alleged crime.94  Accordingly, "a
criminal defense attorney has both a right and a professional
obligation to force the government to prove every element of its
case."
95
There are different possible interpretations of Model Rule
3.1's exception for criminal proceedings. On the one hand, the
exception could simply be a general relaxation of Model Rule 3.1,
allowing criminal defense attorneys to always assert more
questionable positions than attorneys in a civil context, but still
holding criminal defense attorneys, in all situations, to a
ban (albeit relaxed) on asserting frivolous positions. This
interpretation seems to be the position of one treatise that states:
[T]he fact that defense counsel may passively "put the
government to its proof' does not mean that counsel may file
frivolous court papers or engage in frivolous legal
argumentation. Such tactics may demonstrate "diligence" (see
Rule 1.3), but zeal must be subordinated to other concerns and
kept within the bounds of law. The point of Rule 3.1 in
particular is that that boundary line is where a contention on
behalf of a client would be frivolous.
Practical difficulties arise in drawing the line between the
frivolous and the "nonfrivolous but extremely weak." The
dilemma is especially troublesome in criminal matters, where
the lawyer's partisan latitude is greatest, but where the law is
often in flux. If a legal contention is frivolous, it may not be
advanced, but if it has sufficient merit to meet the standard of
Rule 3.1, then an advocate ordinarily has a duty to make the
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
93 Id.
9' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding "that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"); ABA/BNA
LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 61:101 (2004) [hereinafter
LAWYER'S MANUAL].
95 LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 94.
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contention, even if it does not reflect what he personally
considers to be sound law (compare Rule 1.2(b)). 96
The treatise seems to imply that Rule 3.1 is relaxed and allows
for weaker arguments but still applies to criminal defense
lawyers in all situations, including when challenging the
prosecution's case-in-chief.
On the other hand, another interpretation of Model Rule 3.1
is possible. A strict interpretation of the language of the criminal
defense exception would grant a complete exemption from the
Rule in certain circumstances-when challenging the
prosecution's case-in-chief-while retaining the full force of the
Rule in all other circumstances. The Rule states that the lawyer
"may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established."97 The use of the term
"nevertheless" implies a true exception-the lawyer is completely
relieved from the requirements of Model Rule 3.1 when the
lawyer attacks the elements of the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
Thus, even though a criminal defendant has told the lawyer that
he committed the crime, and the lawyer absolutely and
reasonably believes that the client is guilty, the lawyer may,
nonetheless, attack the prosecution's case by any legitimate
means, including the aggressive cross-examination of truthful
prosecution witnesses,98  advancing alternate theories, and
pointing out weaknesses in the prosecution's case.
The text of the Rule, however, appears to state that the
criminal defense lawyer is fully bound by the mandates of Rule
3.1 if the issue does not involve the prosecution's case-in-chief.
For example, under this interpretation of the language of Rule
3.1, a lawyer could raise a "frivolous" challenge to the state's
attempt to prove the defendant's state of mind (assuming that
this was an element of the charged crime), but the criminal
defense attorney could not raise an insanity defense unless there
96 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 27.14.
9' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
98 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (stating that it is proper for criminal defense counsel
to confuse or impeach a truthful witness during cross-examination). On the other
hand, since the defendant told the attorney that he is guilty and the attorney
absolutely and reasonably believes him, the lawyer may not place the defendant on
the stand to perjuriously deny his guilt. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.3(a)(3).
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was a non-frivolous basis for doing so.99 A suppression motion,
however, falls somewhere in between. While the motion itself is
not an element of the prosecutor's case-in-chief, the challenged
evidence may support an element of the prosecutor's case.
May a criminal defense lawyer file a frivolous suppression
motion? An ethics opinion by the Maryland Bar Association is
illustrative. In Ethics Docket 87-30, a defense lawyer in a
criminal case filed a "motion[] to suppress for the sole purpose of
generating a hearing in the hope that necessary witnesses
[would] fail to appear."10 The committee concluded that such an
action would not violate the ethical rules.10 1 The opinion was
apparently based on an actual case in which the police arrested a
lawyer's client following a raid in an area that had a lot of drug
activity. Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence, but
on the day of the hearing, the prosecutor told the court that the
police officer was in another city. The prosecutor sought
guidance from the court. The court told the prosecutor that if the
police officer was not present by a certain time, the court would
have to consider whether to grant a continuance or dismiss the
charges entirely. The defense counsel "informed the Court that if
the police officer arrived, counsel intended to withdraw his
motion to suppress, but if the police officer did not show up, he
would press for dismissal."102 The defense attorney also told the
court that if the court intended to grant a continuance, then that,
of course, could be done. The police officer did arrive later that
day, and the defense attorney withdrew the motion to suppress
evidence.0 3 Relying on the language in Rule 3.1 stating that the
defense lawyer could "defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established,"104 the committee
9 See Kerrin Maureen McCormick, Note, The Constitutional Right to
Psychiatric Assistance: Cause for Reexamination of Ake, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329,
1366 & n.219 (1993) (noting that there are ethical considerations under Model Rule
3.1 that "keep [criminal] defense lawyers from raising frivolous insanity defenses").
100 Md. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 87-30 (1987) (discussing




104 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008). Maryland's Rule 3.1 was
broader than the Model Rule, applying the "every element" exception to all lawyers,
not just criminal defense attorneys. The equivalent sentence in Maryland's Rule
states that "[a] lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
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included the motion to suppress within the "every element"
exception. The committee stated:
Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, the burden is
on the state to prove that the search ... was done legally. A
necessary requirement of proving the legality of the state action
is the existence of a live witness who can testify on behalf of the
state. It is the right of a criminal defendant to require that the
state prove every element of its case by producing witnesses to
testify on the state's behalf to prove the legality of a search and
seizure. This right is recognized in Rule 3.1 and it is irrelevant
whether or not counsel for the defendant intends to withdraw
the motion if the police officer arrives to testify. As you stated
in your inquiry, if the police officer did not arrive, you, as a
judge, would have to consider whether or not to dismiss the
charges. The defendant is entitled to know that the state is
prepared to prove each and every element of its case by having
witnesses present and ready to testify. 105
The committee opined that "an attorney who withdraws a pre-
trial motion merely because a witness is present to testify for the
state to prove its case is not violating Rule 3.1 and its prohibition
against frivolously asserting or controverting an issue before the
court." °6  In fact, criminal defense counsel has "a duty to
challenge the state to prove every element of its case and may
require the presence of witnesses to testify on each and every
element before withdrawing a pre-trial motion."1 7
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve more deeply
into the criminal defense exception to Rule 3.1. The point is that
the demands of Rule 3.1 are in some ways relaxed for criminal
defense lawyers.108 But the principles elucidated in this Article
in discussing civil cases are the same when applied to the
criminal defense context. Assuming a tactic (such as filing a
weak, or even frivolous, motion) is not unethical, then a criminal
defense lawyer may employ that tactic in pursuit of any lawful
client interest, including the hope that witnesses will become
unavailable and the client's desire to delay incarceration or
every element of the moving party's case be established." MD. LAWYER'S RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008).
10' Md. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 87-30 (1987).
106 Id.
107 Id. (emphasis added).
o Indeed, "courts are generally loath to sanction criminal defense lawyers."
Freedman, supra note 13, at 1167-68.
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execution. Indeed, one scholar has argued that a criminal
defense lawyer has a duty to file frivolous motions in a death
penalty case.109
III. COURT CASES
Court cases support the notion that Rule 3.2 imposes no
independent duty. Court sanctions that are imposed for delay
almost invariably involve other conduct by the sanctioned person,
such as advancing frivolous arguments, violating court orders, or
failing to respond to discovery requests. For example, in Jones v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.,11° the court relied on Rule II and on
section 1927 of Title 28, which authorizes a court to sanction an
attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.""1 The court believed that certain
parts of a document submitted by the attorney were designed
"intentionally to delay the proceedings.1 12 The court noted that
the document ran "a monumental 480 pages" and was
"untrustworthy" and "mendacious." 3 The court added that the
lawyer's "intent in opposing summary judgment with [the
document] was not to defend the case on the merits, but to
survive summary judgment by inundating the parties and the
Court with pages upon pages of information that was largely
irrelevant and inadmissible."114 The court also stated that the
documents "contained misstatements, misrepresentations, and
mischaracterizations of the evidence and the record."1 5
So, while the court sanctioned the attorney for delay, the
court acknowledged that it was "in no way contend[ing] that
length alone [was] a sufficient basis for sanctions.1 16 However,
when the "length of the document, 480 pages and 948 paragraphs
of Fact Statement, [was] coupled with numerous misstatements
and mischaracterizations of the record," the document became
"unduly burdensome."1 7
109 Id. at 1177-80.
110 No. 03-0284-CV-W-GAF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33553 (W.D. Mo. July 19,
2005).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
112 Jones, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33553, at *4-5.
113 Id.
114 Id. at *6.
115 Id. at *12.
116 Id. at *17.
Id. at *17-18.
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The lawyer's objective was "to force the opposition either to
yield to its position or be crushed under a great weight of
misstated factual assertions and drown[ in a sea of bombast."118
Therefore, "the oppressive size combined with the overall
untrustworthy nature of the document had a cumulative effect
which this Court found to be 'repugnant to the very concept of
judicial economy.' "119 Thus, the court, in sanctioning the lawyer,
did not rely solely on the policy of avoiding delay (or expediting
litigation) but relied also on the fact that the offending document
was of an oppressive length and full of inadmissible, irrelevant,
and mendacious assertions. Delay, in and of itself, did not
provide a basis for sanctions.
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Quinlin,'2° an attorney filed a
motion to reduce visitation rights and a peremptory challenge,
seeking another judge. The court denied the peremptory
challenge because it was untimely. 2' At the hearing on the
motion to reduce visitation rights, the attorney conducted a
lengthy cross-examination of the opposing party. When the judge
informed the lawyer that he was out of time, the lawyer said he
had more questions and it was going to take more than an hour.
Because matters taking more than two hours had to be heard in
another department, the judge declared a mistrial.122 The trial
court imposed sanctions because the lawyer "had intentionally
exceeded the one-hour estimate knowing the expenditure of time
was unwarranted and had filed a meritless peremptory
challenge." 23 While the appellate court reversed the sanctions
and granted a hearing because the lawyer had not received notice
and an opportunity to respond, the appellate court agreed that
the attorney's conduct had been improper. The court stated that
the lawyer had "accomplished by delay what he had failed to
accomplish by filing the peremptory challenge"-that is,
obtaining a new judge. 24 Here again, a court found a lawyer's
conduct improper because of delay, but this time the delay was in
furtherance of an attempt to get around a court rule regarding
the deadline for filing peremptory challenges.
111 Id. at *18.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 257 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Ct. App. 1989).
121 Id. at 851.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 852.
124 Id.
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Other cases are similar. In Storey v. Cello Holdings,
L.L.C.,125 the court imposed sanctions on an attorney under Rule
11 in part because the lawyer's "answer and defenses were
asserted for improper purposes"-to harass the other party and
"to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation."126 However, in addition, the court found that the
lawyer's factual assertions and denials did "not have evidentiary
support" and were "not warranted on the evidence."127 The
lawyer's legal arguments and defenses were "not objectively
reasonable" and had "no reasonable basis in law or fact."
28
In Karutz v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,129 the court
approved of sanctioning parties and lawyers "who frustrate the
expeditious disposition of appropriate litigated matters by
engaging in dilatory or frivolous conduct during the course of
litigation."3 ° In Karutz, however, the offending lawyer delayed
by using inherently improper tactics-the lawyer twice failed to
appear for a court-ordered examination. 131
Some cases in which a court found that an attorney engaged
in improper delay involve an attorney's failure to comply with
discovery requests or to follow court orders. In In re Alcorn, 32
the attorney violated Rule 3.2 by failing to respond to discovery
requests and by disobeying discovery orders. 33 The failure to file
discovery responses also violated Rule 3.4(c), which states that a
lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal.' 34
125 182 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 347 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2003).
126 Id. at 366.
127 Id.
128 Id., see also In re Shearin, 721 A.2d 157, 163 (Del. 1998) (stating that the
attorney's conduct in the litigation violated Rule 3.2's requirement that a lawyer
expedite litigation and Rule 3.1's ban on bringing "non-meritorious claims and
contentions before the courts").
129 112 Misc. 2d 815, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1981).
130 Id. at 820, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
131 Id. at 816, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
132 No. SB-02-0097-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 171 (Oct. 3, 2002).
133 Id. at *42.
134 Id. at *42-43 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Griffiths, No.
SB-02-0114-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 190, at *5-8 (Oct. 31, 2002) (disciplining lawyer for
failing to appear at numerous court hearings, thus violating ethical rules by failing
"to make reasonable efforts to expedite the litigation" and failing "to obey court
orders"); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lee, 903 A.2d 895, 902 (Md. 2006) (stating
that attorney violated Rule 3.2 when he "[flailed to respond to numerous requests of
the Bankruptcy Trustee to provide necessary annuity documents[,] ... thus delaying
the [litigation]"); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 446 (Md.
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Conversely, if an attorney does not engage in independent
misconduct, there is no violation of Rule 3.2. In In re
Pangman,135 both the attorney and the Wisconsin Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility ("the Board") appealed a
referee's findings concerning a number of alleged disciplinary
violations. At issue was the attorney's conduct in litigation
involving the attorney's own divorce. There were contentious
and extensive post-divorce proceedings, in which the attorney
Pangman represented himself.136 Among the allegations brought
by the Board was that attorney Pangman "failed to make
reasonable efforts to expedite that litigation, as required by [the
Wisconsin version of Rule 3.2] ."137 The court said that the
litigation
generated 1200 pages of transcript, several orders to show
cause-three by Attorney Pangman, six by his former spouse-
and numerous motions and petitions-27 by Attorney Pangman,
15 by his former spouse. In addition, Attorney Pangman filed
seven appeals, one supervisory writ petition, two petitions for
review, and five habeas corpus petitions.1 38
The court, however, found that Pangman had not violated
Rule 3.2. First, there was no evidence that Pangman engaged in
any frivolous action. Second, since Pangman represented
himself, not a client, "there was no violation of the [R]ule's
requirement to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
'consistent with the interest of the client.' ",139 Third, if Pangman
believed that the court's actions were erroneous, he had the right
to challenge those actions. Fourth, there was no evidence that
2004) (stating that the attorney "violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to respond to
discovery requests and defying a court order to be deposed" and also violated Rules
3.1 and 3.2); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hermina, 842 A.2d 762, 771 (Md. 2004)
(finding that an attorney had violated Rule 3.4(c) and Rule 3.2 by failing to
participate in a court-ordered pre-trial conference); In re Allen, 621 S.E.2d. 356,
357-59 (S.C. 2005) (reprimanding lawyer for violating Rule 3.2's duty to expedite
litigation when the lawyer violated 3.4(c), among other rules, by knowingly
disobeying his obligation under the rules of a tribunal by failing to respond to a court
order to deliver to opposing counsel an executed covenant not to execute); In re
Arthur, 694 N.W.2d 910, 921-22 (Wis. 2005) (disciplining attorney for violating Rule
3.2 because he engaged in conduct such as "duplicative litigation, failure to comply
with discovery requests, or other conduct that frustrated the discovery process").
'35 574 N.W.2d 232 (Wis. 1998).
136 Id. at 233-34.
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"Attorney Pangman's intent in making those challenges was
merely to delay the outcome of the proceeding or obtain some
financial advantage." 10 The referee found that Pangman had not
violated Rule 3.2, and the Board did not appeal that finding.141
Thus, violations of the duty in Rule 3.2 to expedite litigation
involve violations of other Rules. If an attorney files frivolous
motions in order to delay, the attorney violates Rule 3.1. If the
attorney delays by failing to respond to discovery requests, the
attorney violates Rule 3.4(d). If the attorney delays by violating
court orders, he violates Rule 3.4(c). Indeed, if an attorney
merely neglects a matter to the detriment of a client, the
attorney violates Rule 1.3.142 If an attorney is serving a client's
interest and uses tactics that are not inherently unethical,
however, the attorney does not violate Rule 3.2.
IV. MODEL RULE 3.2 IMPOSES No INDEPENDENT DUTIES
Thus, a violation of Rule 3.2 requires some wrongful conduct
in addition to delay, such as filing frivolous motions, disobeying
court orders, or failing to respond to discovery requests. An
analogy can be drawn to another area of law-the law of coercion
or duress. The Restatement of Contracts defines duress as
(a) any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation
of apparent assent by another to a transaction without his
volition, or
(b) any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct
that induces another to enter into a transaction under the
influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will
and judgment, if the threat was intended or should reasonably
have been expected to operate as an inducement.
143
140 Id. The court did not state that a lawyer's desire to obtain financial
advantage would be a violation of Rule 3.2.
141 Id.
142 See In re Alcorn, No. SB-02-0097-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 171, at *42 (Oct. 3,
2002) ("Conduct violative of Rule 3.2 correspondingly breaches the basic duties
imposed by Rule 1.3, the latter being broader in application."); see also In re Loftus,
No. SB-01-0070-D, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 50, at *19 (Apr. 6, 2001) (stating that lawyer's
failure to pursue the client's case violates Rule 1.3 and, "similarly," Rule 3.2);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 annot. (2008) ("[V]iolations of Rule 1.3's
duty of diligence typically accompany violations of other ethics rules, most
frequently Rule 1.1 (Competence)....").
143 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932). As noted by Professors Rhode
and Luban, "[tihe Restatement of Contracts (Second) does not define duress, but its
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The Restatement notes that "duress under part (a) is very rare,
because it refers to cases in which the person 'is a mere
mechanical instrument or wholly unaware of what he is doing,'
as when he is hypnotized."144 According to Alan Wertheimer,
part (b) of the Restatement adopts a "two-pronged theory of
duress."'45  Under this two-pronged approach, "[flirst, the
statement must leave the victim no reasonable choice but to
acquiesce; and second, it must be independently wrongful. 146
Thus,
exploiting a party's vulnerability may be coercive without
constituting duress if the conduct was not fraudulent or
otherwise illegal. Versions of this theory inform not only the
law of contracts, but also the law of torts, marriage, adoption,
wills, confessions, plea bargaining, and the duress and necessity
defenses in criminal law.
147
According to Wertheimer, there are two "most important
principles" in deciding whether something is "wrongful" as
opposed to morally objectionable: 14
First, it is wrong to propose to do that which is independently
illegal. Second, and a corollary of the first principle, it is
generally not wrong to propose to exercise a legal right: "It is
not 'duress' to threaten to do that which a party has a legal
right to do." 1
49
Thus, an action compelling another to do something against
his will is not considered duress unless the action was
independently wrongful. Similarly, delay, in and of itself, should
discussion of duress in §§[ ]174-76 is consistent with the definition quoted here."
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 384 n.10 (3d ed. 2001).
144 RHODE & LuBAN, supra note 143, at 384 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. a (1932)).
145 ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 30 (1987).
146 RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 143, at 384 (citing WERTHEIMER, supra note
145, at 129-45).
141 Id. at 384. Professors Rhode and Luban describe a tactic that many people
would find unfair or immoral but that is a legal use of bargaining power:
Consider the "ultimatum bargaining game": Rich and Poor are offered
$1000 to divide as they will, provided that they agree on a division. If they
don't agree, neither of them gets any money at all. Rich offers Poor $100,
threatening to walk unless Poor accepts. Since Rich can afford to make
good on the threat, and Poor needs the money, Poor accepts. Is this coercive
or otherwise unfair use of bargaining power?
Id.
148 WERTHEIMER, supra note 145, at 38.
149 Id. at 39 (quoting Ellis v. First Nat'l Bank, 260 S.W. 714, 715 (Ark. 1924)).
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not be considered unethical unless there is another
independently wrongful action.
V. THE DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND
ATTORNEY: MUST AN ATTORNEY SEEK DELAY AT THE CLIENT'S
BEHEST?
A lawyer may use tactics that are not inherently unethical to
achieve delay to serve a client's lawful purposes. Must a lawyer,
however, always follow a client's instructions to seek delay? The
answer is clearly no. Model Rule 1.2(a) distinguishes between
objectives, purposes, or ends of the representation and the means
or tactics used to accomplish them. Model Rule 1.2(a) states:
"[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued. ' 150  Thus, the Rules place responsibility for decisions
regarding the objectives of the representation in the hands of the
client while the lawyer generally has responsibility for decisions
regarding means or tactics. 15 1
In fact, if a client orders his lawyer to employ means that
would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or violate other
law, the lawyer would have a duty both to explain matters to the
client 52 and to refuse to obey the client's instructions.1 53 What if
the client, however, wants to use means that do not, in and of
themselves, violate the rules but with which the lawyer
fundamentally disagrees? Under most circumstances, the lawyer
may, after consultation, refuse to abide by the client's decisions.
If this becomes a contentious issue between the lawyer and the
client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation under
Model Rule 1.16(b)(4), which allows for withdrawal if "the client
insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or
150 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008).
151 See 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 5.5 (3d ed. Supp 2004).
1'52 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (requiring the lawyer to
"reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives
are to be accomplished").
1'3 See id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring the lawyer to withdraw from representing a
client if "the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law"); see also id. R. 1.16 cmt. 2 (stating that ordinarily a lawyer
must withdraw "if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is
illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct").
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with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement."'54 For
example, if the client insists on using delaying tactics and the
lawyer fundamentally disagrees, the lawyer may withdraw. On
the other hand, if the client has a problem with the lawyer's
refusal to engage in delaying tactics, the client may discharge the
lawyer. Under Model Rule 1.16(a)(3), the client's termination of
the lawyer requires that the lawyer withdraw. 155
Thus, a lawyer does not have to agree to a client's desire to
engage in delaying tactics. While a lawyer must pursue the
client's interests with zeal, commitment, and dedication, the
lawyer "is not bound ... to press for every advantage that might
be realized for a client.' 56
If a lawyer has objections to the client's desire to use
delaying tactics, the lawyer should consult with the client about
those objections and may give the reasons for them, including
moral reasons. Model Rule 1.4(a)(2) requires a lawyer to
"reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished.' 1 57  The duty to
"reasonably consult" should include the lawyer's reasons for
disagreeing with the client's proposed course of action.
Furthermore, Model Rule 2.1 states: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations, such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation.' 158
To summarize, assuming that a lawyer uses tactics that are
not inherently unethical, a lawyer may seek delay to serve a
client's interest so long as that interest is not unlawful or
fraudulent. Rule 3.2 imposes no independent duties. A violation
of Rule 3.2 does not rest on the distinction between "legitimate"
154 Id. R. 1.16(b)(4); see also id. R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (noting that if, after consultation,
the lawyer and the client cannot agree about means or tactical matters, "the lawyer
may withdraw from the representation" (citing id. R. 1.16(b)(4))). When a lawyer
withdraws, the lawyer must "comply with applicable law requiring notice to or
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation" and must take
reasonable measures to protect the client's interests. Id. R. 1.16(c), (d).
155 Id. R. 1.16(a)(3).
156 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
157 Id. R. 1.4(a)(2).
158 Id. R. 2.1.
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and "illegitimate" client interests. The key distinction is between
improper and proper tactics.
On the other hand, if a lawyer fundamentally disagrees with
the client's desire to seek delay or with the client's reason for
doing so, the lawyer may raise these objections with the client. If
the lawyer cannot persuade the client, the lawyer can, in most
circumstances, refuse to "press for every advantage" 159 or seek to
withdraw from the representation. 16 0 Conversely, if the client is
dissatisfied with the lawyer's performance, the client may
discharge the lawyer and the lawyer must withdraw.16 ' These
principles can now be applied to the hypotheticals presented at
the beginning of this Article.
VI. THE HYPOTHETICALS
Assuming that the lawyer does not use tactics that are
inherently unethical, may the lawyer delay in the following
situations?
Hypothetical 1-In a civil action, a court decides for the plaintiff
and instructs the plaintiffs lawyer to draft a form of judgment
and give it to the defendant's lawyer for approval. The
defendant and the defendant's lawyer, however, prefer not to
approve the proposed judgment because there is another case
pending before a different court and the ruling on appeal in the
latter case could provide a justification for a reconsideration or
reversal of the first judgment against the defendant. Once the
judgment is entered in the defendant's case, the clock will begin
to run on an appeal or a motion for a new trial. Delaying the
entry of judgment, therefore, could have a beneficial effect on
the defendant's case. If the defendant's attorney fails to
approve the proposed judgment, the plaintiff will have other
means under the state's rules of civil procedure to pursue his
judgment. In order to delay the entry of judgment, the
defendant's lawyer refuses to approve the proposed judgment. 162
The lawyer may refuse to approve the proposed judgment.
The client's interests justify the lawyer's refusal to approve the
proposed judgment to prevent judgment from being entered
159 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
160 See id. R. 1.16(b)(4).
161 See id. R. 1.16(a)(3).
162 See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 90-16 (1990),
available at 1990 WL 10521405.
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immediately. 163 The defendant's attorney is not "obligated to
take affirmative steps to shorten the time within which relief
may be awarded against his client," and the procedural rules
provide [other] means for the plaintiff to pursue his judgment."164
The requirement in Rule 3.2 that attorneys expedite
litigation does not prevent the attorney from delaying matters in
this context, nor should it. As far as the attorney's duties are
concerned, the client's interests in delaying the entry of judgment
should prevail.
Hypothetical 2-The plaintiff files a complaint in a civil action.
The jurisdiction's rules of civil procedure allow the defendant
thirty days to file an answer. The defendant's attorney,
however, has the answer prepared within five days.
Nevertheless, the defendant's attorney waits until the thirtieth
day to file the answer. He does not have a good reason for
waiting.165
The attorney may wait the full thirty days to file the answer.
A defendant may withhold answering a complaint, and a party
may withhold responding to discovery for the full time period
allowed by the jurisdiction's rules; "such 'withholding' does not
become prescribed 'delay' even if the party were ready to answer
the complaint or reply to the discovery prior to expiration of the
prescribed time limits."166 Notwithstanding the requirements of
Rule 3.2, if the rules of civil procedure grant a party a certain
amount of time, the party is justified in taking the full amount of
time allowed.
Hypothetical 3-A law firm represents an insurance company, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a national drug company.
Insurance defense work for the insurance company forms a
substantial portion of the billable hours of two of the law firm's
partners. The insurance company informs the law firm that the
drug company is drawing heavily on the insurance company's
financial reserves in order to defeat an attempt at a leveraged
buyout of the drug company. The insurance company requests
the law firm to "seek delays in all pending cases to avoid the
possibility of adverse publicity and adverse cash flow that would





167 See Elkins, supra note 6, at 774 n.79.
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would presumably assist the drug company's fight against the
buyout. The law firm accedes to the client's request.
168
The lawyer may seek delay, assuming the lawyer uses tactics
that are not inherently unethical. The comment to Model Rule
3.2 states that "[rlealizing financial or other benefit from
otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest
of the client."'6 9 Here, the delay is not "otherwise improper" and
the client's interest in preserving financial reserves will trump
the interest in expediting the litigation. The lawyer, of course,
may tell the client, "I do not practice that way," and refuse to
obey the client's instructions, 7 ° but the lawyer will not be subject
to discipline if she follows the client's instructions.
Hypothetical 4-A federal agency decided to impose a ban on
certain chemical preservatives in wine that cause cancer. The
lawyer's client, a vineyard owner, has already produced half of
the current season's wines with one of those preservatives. The
client is afraid that he will have to shut down the vineyard if he
cannot sell the wine prior to the promulgation of the regulation.
The owner laments the loss of his employees' livelihood and
mentions the hope that, in the future, the federal agency will
discover scientific evidence that will cause it to reverse the ban
on the preservatives. He also mentions that it is "foolish to
worry about carcinogenic additives to the food and liquids we
consume" when there are "so many 'natural' cancer-causing
agents."'7 1 The owner asks his lawyer to use the legal system to
obtain enough of a delay to allow the vineyard to sell the wine
before the ban goes into effect. The lawyer complies.
172
The lawyer may delay. Since the sale of the wine is not
currently illegal, the lawyer will not be assisting the client in
violating the law. 73 Assuming the lawyer uses tactics that are
not inherently unethical, the delay is not "otherwise improper.' 17 4
The lawyer can certainly attempt to talk his client out of selling
168 Id.
169 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1 (2008) (emphasis added).
170 See infra notes 173-186 and accompanying text.
17 See Elkins, supra note 6, at 777-78 (citing MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note
8, at 136-40).
172 Id.
173 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent....").
174 See id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
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the wine. 75  In addition, the lawyer's use of delaying tactics to
allow the client to sell the wine may be immoral, and the lawyer,
after consultation with the client, can refuse to go along with the
client's wishes. However, the use of delaying tactics in these
circumstances does not violate Model Rule 3.2.
Hypothetical 5-Lawyer A is negotiating a settlement
agreement with Lawyer B who is desperately trying to finish
the deal because he has bought non-refundable, super-saver
tickets for a European vacation with his family. Lawyer A's
client wants Lawyer A to use delaying tactics to take advantage
of Lawyer B's vulnerability in order to squeeze him for every
possible advantage. Lawyer A does so.176
Again, the lawyer may use delaying tactics to exploit the
opposing lawyer's vulnerability. While the tactics are not
appealing and the lawyer is entitled to refuse to engage in such
tactics, the lawyer is not subject to discipline. In fact, it is
actually the vacationing attorney who allows his vulnerability to
be exploited at his client's expense who will be subject to
discipline.177
Hypothetical 6-Plaintiff sues defendant for $10 million. The
defendant acknowledges to his lawyer that he clearly owes the
plaintiff the money, and the lawyer knows that the plaintiff will
be able to prove the case at trial. The client, however, asks the
lawyer to delay because he (the defendant) is earning an
incredible return on the money, much more than the interest
the defendant will have to pay on any judgment. The lawyer
complies with the client's requests. 178
The lawyer may delay the proceedings. While the comment
to Model Rule 3.2 states that "[r]ealizing financial or other
benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a
legitimate interest of the client,"1 9 there is no showing that the
delay is "otherwise improper." 80 The text of the Rule clearly
subordinates the duty to expedite litigation to "the interests of
175 See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
.. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 783.
177 The vacationing lawyer would probably be violating Model Rule 1.1, which
requires a lawyer to provide competent representation, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1, and Model Rule 1.7, which bans the representation of a client if
"there is a significant risk that the representation... will be materially
limited... by a personal interest of the lawyer," id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
178 See 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.4 (3d ed. 2007 Supp.).
1'9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
180 Id.
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the client."1"' The lawyer may refuse to go along with the client's
request to use delaying tactics, but if the lawyer chooses to use
tactics that are not inherently unethical to achieve delay, the
lawyer should not be disciplined.
Hypothetical 7-In a criminal case, the defense lawyer makes a
decision, with the consent of his client, to refrain from making a
speedy trial defense in order to delay a trial "as long as possible
so that the prosecution might make a serious error, witnesses'
memories might deteriorate, or witnesses may become
unavailable. "82
The defense lawyer has no duty to make a speedy trial
defense. It is up to the prosecution to accelerate matters if the
prosecution is concerned about proving its case. This is similar
to Hypothetical 2, in which a lawyer uses the full amount of time
allowed to file papers.
Hypothetical 8-A criminal defendant's mental health problems
make him incompetent to stand trial although taking
medication would restore the defendant's competence. The
defendant's lawyer believes delaying the trial might benefit the
defendant (because witnesses may become unavailable or the
government may abandon the prosecution). The lawyer advises
the defendant of the benefits of refusing medication to delay the
return of the defendant's competence to stand trial.18 3
Assuming that the client has the right to refuse medication,
then the lawyer can advise him of that right.
Hypothetical 9-The lawyer's client, a criminal defendant,
acknowledges his guilt. The state is almost certain that it will
be able to prove his guilt at trial and that the defendant will be
sentenced to a lengthy jail term. The defendant is free on bond
and asks his lawyer to keep him out of jail for as long as
possible. The lawyer engages in delaying tactics to keep his
client out of jail.
The client's desire to avoid jail for as long as possible is an
interest of the client that trumps the lawyer's duty to expedite
litigation. In addition, a criminal defense lawyer has a certain
leeway in regard to the tactics that she uses.184 The lawyer,
181 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
182 See People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 695 (Colo. 1984); see also WOLFRAM,
supra note 11, § 11.2.5 n.44.
1'3 See Siegel, supra note 12, at 22, 28-30.
184 See supra Part II.B.
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therefore, may engage in such delaying tactics to keep her client
out of jail.
Hypothetical 10-Same facts as in Hypothetical 9, but in this
case the client, a convicted murderer, is on death row. The
client has asked his lawyer to delay his execution as long as
possible. The lawyer does so.18 5
The lawyer is in the same boat as the lawyer in Hypothetical
9 but with the added factor of the death penalty. In fact, it could
be argued that the lawyer has an ethical and moral duty to delay
the client's execution as long as possible, and one scholar has
contended that the lawyer has a duty to raise even frivolous
issues in death penalty cases.18 6
In all of these hypotheticals an attorney may use ethical
tactics to delay. It is up to courts, through the use of deadlines
and docket management, to move these cases along.
VII. SHOULD MODEL RULE 3.2 BE REPEALED?
Since Model Rule 3.2 adds no independent duty to the Model
Rules and the comment to the Rule is confusing, the question
arises: Should Model Rule 3.2 be repealed? An analogous
example is the history of the ban on threatening prosecution to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter. The original Model Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 7-105(A) stated: "A lawyer
shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter."18 7 Some authorities applied the provision rather strictly.
As Professor Wolfram has pointed out:
Courts applying the rule commonly draw no distinction between
well-founded or ill-founded charges or between serious crimes
and minor infractions. The decisions have also not accepted
lawyer arguments that a veiled allusion to the criminal nature
of a person's conduct or the like does not constitute a "threat" or
that the lawyer was motivated by concerns in addition to
"solely" obtaining an advantage in civil litigation. The courts
apply the Code rule as a pure attempt prohibition; a violation is
made out by proof of a threat, regardless of the fact that no
185 See Freedman, supra note 13, at 1178 (discussing Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d
1459, 1476 (1lth Cir. 1983)).
186 Id. at 1179-80.
1' MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1980).
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criminal charges are in fact brought or any settlement
achieved.'
In promulgating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
the American Bar Association deliberately omitted the Model
Code's ban on threatening criminal prosecution to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter because it was "redundant or
overbroad or both."'8 9 The ban covered "much the same ground
as the crimes of extortion and compounding crime," conduct
already banned by Model Rule 8.4.190 In Formal Opinion 92-
363,191 the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility noted that Model Rule 8.4(b) bans a
lawyer from committing "a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects," '192 and a lawyer's unlawful extortionate conduct
would violate that provision. 19 3 An attorney who used "even a
well-founded threat of criminal charges merely to harass a third
person" would violate Model Rule 4.4, which bans a lawyer from
using means that "'have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.' 194 An attorney who
threatened criminal prosecution "without any actual intent to so
proceed, violates Rule 4.1," which requires lawyers "to be truthful
when dealing with others on a client's behalf."' 9' Furthermore,
an attorney who threatened criminal prosecution that was "not
well founded in fact and in law," or "threaten[s] such prosecution
in furtherance of a civil claim that is not well founded," would
violate Model Rule 3.1, which "prohibits an advocate from
asserting frivolous claims."' 96 Finally, in certain circumstances,
the ban in Model Rule 8.4(d) and (e) on a lawyer engaging in
conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice" and
stating or implying "an ability improperly to influence a
government official or agency" may be implicated.' 97
188 See WOLFRAM, supra note 11, § 13.5.
189 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 10, § 40.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2008).
190 Id.
191 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
192 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2008).
193 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
194 Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4).
195 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1).
196 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1).
197 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d), (e)).
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The Committee concluded that a threat to bring criminal
charges for the purposes of advancing a client's civil claim would
not violate the Model Rules unless the underlying criminal
charges "were unrelated to the client's civil claim," or "the lawyer
did not believe both the civil and the potential criminal charges
to be well-founded, or if the threat constituted an attempt to
exert or suggest improper influence over the criminal process. 19'
The Committee noted that dropping the general ban on
threatening criminal prosecution was justified because "such a
prohibition would be overbroad, excessively restricting a lawyer
from carrying out his or her responsibility to 'zealously' assert
the client's position under the adversary system."'99 Placing
limits on an attorney's duty to his or her client was not "justified
when the criminal charges are well founded in fact and law, stem
from the same matter as the civil claim, and are used to gain
legitimate relief for the client."200
CONCLUSION
The ABA's deletion of the ban on threatening criminal
prosecution could serve as a model for the deletion of Model Rule
3.2. As with the ban on threatening criminal prosecution, the
worst evils that Rule 3.2 covers are dealt with by other Rules. If
a lawyer delays to serve a client's illegal or fraudulent purposes,
the lawyer violates Rule 1.2(d).2°1 If the client has no reason for
delay, but simply wants to delay in order to harass the opposing
party, a lawyer who engages in delaying tactics in furtherance of
that goal violates Rule 4.4(a).2 °2 A lawyer who neglects a matter
to her client's detriment violates Rule 1.3.203 On the other hand,
a lawyer who uses unethical tactics to serve a lawful client




201 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not.., assist a
client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.").
202 Id. R. 4.4(a) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person.").
203 Id. R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
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lawyer who delays by filing frivolous motions in a civil case, °4
lying to a tribunal,2 °5 lying to another person about a material
fact,20 6 disobeying court orders,207 making frivolous discovery
requests, or failing to respond to an opposing party's discovery
requests20 8 violates specific rules governing those actions. Thus,
unless certain lawful client interests (for example, money,
tactical advantages in litigation, delaying incarceration, or the
death penalty) render the use of otherwise legitimate tactics
unethical, Model Rule 3.2 does not add any independent
obligations. As discussed in this Article, courts and disciplinary
authorities should not construe Rule 3.2 to deem some lawful
client purposes "legitimate" and other purposes "illegitimate." A
lawyer should not be disciplined for using ethical tactics to serve
lawful client interests. Courts and disciplinary authorities are
not equipped to render judgment on whether a certain client
interest is legitimate or illegitimate. In addition, making such
determinations in disciplinary settings may force attorneys to
reveal confidential information in order to defend their conduct.
Furthermore, if Model Rule 3.2 is interpreted to legitimize
certain lawful client interests and delegitimize others, lawyers
will not be able to predict what conduct will subject them to
discipline. Ethical lawyers may be deterred from giving their
clients the zealous representation that they deserve. As stated
by the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, in discussing the deletion of the ban
on threatening criminal prosecution, "such a prohibition would be
overbroad, excessively restricting a lawyer from carrying out his
or her responsibility to 'zealously' assert the client's position
under the adversary system. 20 9 Model Rule 3.2 could have the
same effect.
204 Id. R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is
not frivolous.").
205 Id. R. 3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact
or law to a tribunal.").
206 Id. R. 4.1(a) (stating that a lawyer representing a client "shall not knowingly
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person").
207 Id. R. 3.4(c) (barring a lawyer from "knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal").
208 Id. R. 3.4(d) (barring a lawyer from "mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or
fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery
request by an opposing party").
'09 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
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All of these concerns support an argument for the repeal of
Model Rule 3.2. However, there are opposing arguments. Since
courts have not construed Rule 3.2 to impose independent duties
on lawyers, there is little danger of squelching zealous advocacy.
When lawyers are serving a lawful client interest, courts do not
sanction the lawyers unless the attorneys engage in other
misconduct.21 ° In addition, the text of Model Rule 3.2 serves a
hortatory purpose, expressing the general policy of the Rules of
favoring promptness and diligence.211 There is nothing wrong
with reiterating that attorneys should act expeditiously, so long
as the lawyer acts consistently with the client's interests. Thus,
it is not necessary to drop the text of Model Rule 3.2.
The comment to Model Rule 3.2, however, is another matter.
The comment is confusing and provides very little guidance. The
comment's ambiguity presents a danger that authorities could
interpret the comment in a way that will hinder zealous
advocacy. One highly regarded treatise, in analyzing the
comment's language, states: "Plainly, under the Rules delay in
litigation can no longer be justified simply by invoking client
interest. Enforcement of such a rule, however, will probably
require an adjustment to the professional expectations of many
lawyers and judges.2 12 The treatise cites to People v. Moody213
and parenthetically describes the case in the following manner:
"[D]efense lawyer not ineffective for failure to raise speedy trial
defense in view of lawyer's strategy to delay trial 'as long as
possible so that the prosecution might make a serious error,
witnesses' memories might deteriorate, or witnesses may become
unavailable.' "214 Hypothetical 7 was based on this case.215 The
treatise's implication is that the lawyer's conduct in Moody was
improper under the comment's language. This is an amazing
result-foregoing a speedy trial defense in the client's interest is
disciplinable! The same logic could make the attorney's conduct
in all the other hypotheticals disciplinable. Even the lawyer in
Hypothetical 2, who finished drafting an answer early, but took
the allotted time to file, would be subject to discipline. Such a
210 See generally supra Part I.
211 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. $ 4 ("In all professional functions a
lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent.").
212 WOLFRAM, supra note 11, § 11.2.5 (emphasis added).
212 676 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1984).
214 WOLFRAM, supra note 11, § 11.2.5 n.44 (quoting Moody, 676 P.2d at 695).
211 See supra notes 11, 182 and accompanying text.
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result would truly be a revolution in litigation practice, one not
supported by the text of Rule 3.2. As discussed above, the text of
the Rule subordinates the duty to expedite litigation to lawful
client interests.216
Although the text of the Rule is authoritative and a comment
cannot add obligations to the Rule,217 the comment to Rule 3.2 is
highly confusing and may be susceptible to an erroneous
interpretation. Thus, the comment to Model Rule 3.2 should be
deleted and replaced with a bare bones comment that reinforces
the hortatory language of the text. An appropriate comment
would simply reiterate that an attorney should act promptly at
all times so long as those actions are consistent with the lawful
interests of the client.
In conclusion, in interpreting Rule 3.2, courts and
disciplinary authorities should adhere to the language of the
Rule's text. That language subordinates the requirements to
expedite litigation to the interests of the client. The only time
authorities should find a violation of Rule 3.2 is in two sets of
circumstances: The first set of circumstances is when the lawyer
delays by using inherently unethical tactics. Such tactics violate
other provisions of the Rules, such as the ban on filing frivolous
motions,218 filing frivolous discovery requests,1 9 or lying to a
tribunal. 220 The second set of circumstances is when the lawyer
delays to serve an unlawful or fraudulent client purpose (a
violation of Rule 1.2(d)),22' or the delaying action has no
substantial purpose other than to delay, embarrass, or burden a
third party (a violation of Rule 4.4(a)).222 Assuming, however,
that the client has some lawful purpose (such as saving money,
obtaining an advantage in litigation, delaying incarceration, or
delaying imposition of the death penalty), and the lawyer does
not use tactics that are inherently unethical, Rule 3.2 should not
come into play. Courts should not distinguish between types of
lawful client purposes, deeming some of them "legitimate" and
others "illegitimate." A lawyer, of course, does not have to
216 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
217 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 9 14, 21 (2008).
218 See id. R. 3.1.
219 See id. R. 3.4(d).
220 See id. R. 3.3(a)(1).
221 Id. R. 1.2(d).
222 Id. R. 4.4(a).
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always acquiesce in a client's request for delay.22 3 If, however, a
lawyer delays by using ethical tactics to serve a lawful client
purpose, the lawyer should not be subject to discipline.
223 See supra notes 150-161 and accompanying text.
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